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An Assessment of Mortgage Loan Default Propensity in Ghana 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: Credit market development requires appropriate credit assessment and default policies. 
This paper examines the impact of household characteristics on mortgage default using survey 
data collected from Ghanaian financial institutions.  
Design/methodology/approach: Data was gathered using semi-structured questionnaires from 
customers of five universal banks in Ghana. A logistic regression was used to model the 
determinants of credit default propensity.  
Findings: Contrary to established knowledge, the study shows that females are more likely to 
default on credit than their male counterparts. This is even more likely if the female is older, 
unmarried, divorced, financially illiterate and has lower educational attainments. These factors 
are associated with lower earning capacity, which increases default tendencies. The findings 
confirm that price instability (typified by excessive movements in inflation and exchange rates in 
addition to low national savings rate) are adversely linked to credit defaults. Borrower’s 
perception of constraints to credit access (such as collateral requirements, interest rate and loan 
size) influence credit default. Banks should be encouraged to invest in the financial literacy skills 
development of their customers to mitigate credit default tendencies. 
Practical/ social implications: The study is of practical value to credit officers and the 
development of the credit market in Ghana. A novel model is presented for assessing credit 
applications and developing credit default policies.  
Originality/value: The research findings have not only expanded the frontiers of literature but 
also empirically examined the determinants of credit default propensity, which provides a basis 
for developing and improving credit default policy in the credit market. 
 
Keywords: Customers, Default, Ghana, Low-income groups, Mortgage,  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mortgage financing enable individuals and households with limited financial resources to access 
homeownership (Karanja, 2013) through the flow of funds to end users (Goodman and Ho, 2004; 
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Karanja, 2013). Despite its recognized economic and social importance, mortgage finance 
remains under-developed in most developing countries. For instance, mortgage credit as a 
proportion of gross domestic product is less than 10 per cent in most developing economies such 
as Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt and Cameroon, but more the 50 per cent in developed economies such 
as the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark (Badev et al., 2014). 
Existing empirical work attributes these wide variations to differences in creditor rights 
protection, credit information sharing and macroeconomic stability (Warnock and Warnock, 
2008). Specifically, macroeconomic bottlenecks such as high and volatile inflation and high 
unemployment levels have been problematic in terms of pricing and affordability (Goodman and 
Ho, 2004; Karanja, 2013).  
 
Existing studies also suggest an incompatibility between the conditions of low-income groups 
(LIG) and the requirements of formal housing financiers (Keys et al., 2014; Kamete, 2007). 
While LIG are rarely able to meet the stringent requirements for eligibility and loan terms, the 
financial institutions are unable to compromise and accommodate these groups since doing so 
would unnecessarily increase risks and jeopardize profitability (Skobba and Goetz, 2013). 
Investigations conducted by Akuffo (2006) suggest that the house price to affordability ratio in 
Ghana is 12 compared with 4 in developed countries. According to Tunstall et al. (2013), the 
middle-income group spend an average of 30 percent of their income on accommodation while 
the LIG spends 56 percent of income on accommodation.  
 
Nwuba, et al. (2015) suggests that previous studies conducted in the UK (c.f. Barker, 2004), 
Australia (c.f. Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, 2003) and New Zealand (c.f. 
Hargreaves, 2003), the USA (c.f. Gyourko and Linneman, 1993) and Nigeria (c.f. Chatterjee, 
1982; Onyike, 2007) demonstrate that affordability constraints have increasingly limited access 
to homeownership for LIG. Higher real disposable income per person therefore increases the 
affordability of housing (Wolswijk, 2005) and reduces default tendencies. However, the 
literature concerning the impact of adverse trigger events, such as changing borrower 
characteristics (e.g. unemployment) is less well developed, particularly in developing economies. 
This is because an empirical evaluation of the impact of adverse trigger events on mortgage 
performance requires household-level data that can be linked to loan-level mortgage 
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performance data. Such household-level trigger events data are however not widely available 
therefore, empirical research on mortgage default in developing economies remain an 
unchartered territory.  
 
This paper examines the impact of household characteristics on mortgage default using survey 
data collected from financial institutions in Ghana. The remainder of the paper is divided into six 
sections. Section II reviews the literature concerning theory and empirical causes of mortgage 
default. Section III describes the data and methods used in the analysis. Section VI provides a 
descriptive analysis of household characteristics. Section V presents the econometric analysis 
based on a competing-risk framework. Section V1 presents implications for research and policy.  
 
2. MORTGAGE DEFAULT: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
Mortgage default has been studied extensively due to its negative financial and social impacts 
upon society (c.f. Quigley and Van Order 1995; Epperson et al., 1992; Foster and Van Order 
1984; Campbell and Dietrich 1983). There are two alternative views of home mortgage default 
behaviour – Equity theory and Ability-to-pay theory (Jackson and Kasserman, 1980). Recent 
studies incorporate trigger events (e.g. divorce, loss of a job, and accident or sudden death) to 
assess their influence upon default behaviour (c.f. Riddiough, 1991). However, previous 
empirical work has no firm conclusions about the relative importance of equity and affordability 
in mortgage default behaviour. While most literature finds the equity position to be the primary 
determinant in mortgage default decisions, some studies argue that non-equity effects (such as 
the source of income) are more significant (Wong et al., 2004). 
 
Equity Theory of Default 
The Equity theory of default hinges upon the idea that borrowers base their default decisions on a 
rational comparison of financial costs and returns involved in continuing or terminating 
mortgage payments. As rational agents, borrowers maximize their financial gains and minimize 
their financial loss. Borrowers attempt to maximise the equity position in the mortgaged property 
at each point of time. They cease to continue payments if the market value of the mortgaged 
property declines sufficiently to equal the outstanding mortgage loan balance at any time. 
Borrowers therefore refrain from loan default as long as income flows are sufficient to meet the 
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periodic payment without undue financial burden. According to this theory, the measure of the 
equity position of borrowers - current loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio - is the most important factor 
in default decisions (Elul, 2006).  
 
Ability-to Pay-Theory of Default 
This theory, also known as the ‘cash flow approach’ suggests that when income flow remains 
sufficient to meet the periodic payment without undue financial burden, borrowers will refrain 
from defaulting on the loan. Contrary to the equity theory, the current debt servicing ratio 
(CDSR - defined as the monthly repayment obligations as a percentage of current monthly 
income) which captures the repayment capability of the borrower, plays a critical role in 
accounting for defaults (ibid). Whether default is triggered by on the basis of equity theory or the 
ability-to-pay theory, default can be treated as an option which is well established in the extant 
literature (cf. Campbell and Dietrich 1983; Foster and Van Order 1984; Epperson et al., 1992; 
Quigley and Van Order 1995).  
 
Option Theoretical Approach to Default and Evidence 
Since the 1980s, the Option theory has emerged as an important theoretical advance in the 
residential mortgage literature. An option is a contract in which one party obtains the right to buy 
or sell some underlying asset to another party for a pre-specified price, known as the ‘strike’ or 
‘exercise’ price. When the party has the right to buy the asset at a fixed price, the contract is 
known as a call option; if the party has the right to sell the asset, it is known as a put option. 
Considering borrowers as welfare maximizers who actively evaluate different options to 
maximize their utility (pecuniary gain, borrowers should default on a mortgage when they have 
sufficient funds) whenever the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house. In this case, 
a borrower’s ability to default on a mortgage becomes a put option.  
 
Various empirical studies (in three strands of research investigation) have applied the option 
theory to mortgage defaults. The first strand encompasses those that indicate that a higher current 
loan-to-value ratio is associated with a higher risk of mortgage default (Capozza et al., 1998; 
Deng et al., 2000; Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2010; Goodman et al., 2010). Kau, et al., (1993) 
illustrated that the default probability is concave over time and that both higher current loan-to-
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value ratio and lower house value increase the default probability. The second strand argues that 
some mortgage defaults result from adverse triggers such as divorce and loss of employment 
(Ambrose and Capone, 1998; Capozza et al., 1998; Vandell and Thibodeau 1985; Vandell 1995; 
Capone 2002). While some studies show a positive association between higher rates of 
unemployment and elevated rates of default and foreclosure (cf. Capozza et al., 1997; Elmer and 
Seelig 1999, and Pennington-Cross and Ho 2010), others including a study by Deng et al. (2000) 
in the US find no statistically significant relationship for some key states like California and 
Texas (c.f. Clapp et al., 2001; Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet 2007; An et al., 2010; 
Ghent and Kudlyak 2011). Possible explanations for these contradictory findings may include 
differences in the data used, the time period considered and measurement of important variables.  
 
The third strand encompasses ‘events trigger-mortgage default’ and suggests that negative equity 
is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for mortgage default. In that case, considering very 
high loan loss severity for their loan sample, Lekkas et al. (1993) argue that even in the presence 
of significant negative equity, borrowers wait a long time before defaulting. Bhutta et al. (2010) 
for instance, found only very high levels of negative equity can trigger default for equity reasons. 
Thus, only a small fraction of ‘underwater mortgages’ end in foreclosure (Foote et al., 2008). 
Beside other factors such as the transaction costs of terminating a mortgage, Vandell (1995) 
suggests that trigger events like relocation, divorce, and job loss are vital determinants of 
mortgage termination. While Elul et al. (2010) suggests that the impact of illiquidity on mortgage 
default is comparable to that of the current loan-to-value ratio, Riley (2013) suggests that rather 
than equity fundamentals, liquidity constraints are more likely to trigger default among 
community reinvestment loan recipients.  
 
Other research uses trigger event proxies to study mortgage defaults. Elmer and Seelig’s 
theoretical model includes trigger events, insolvency and option-based financial incentives to 
show that insolvency is the primary motivation for default (Elmer and Seelig, 1999). 
Subsequently, in a study of evictions, repossessions and other housing finance difficulties of 
homeowners and renters in Britain, Boheim and Taylor (2000) illustrate that negative financial 
shocks are key triggers of eviction. Moreover, higher unemployment rates at the local level is 
associated with higher unemployment at the national level (Deng et al., 2000). More recently, 
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Quercia et al., (2012) indicates that although both the structural and cyclical components of 
unemployment are associated with higher risk of default, the former at the local level is more 
relevant in predicting mortgage default.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD  
The study adopts a quantitative approach (Adams et al., 2007) involving deductive reasoning 
(Wilson, 2013; Patton, 2002). A field survey using a random administration of 120 closed-end 
structured questionnaires was undertaken to collect data from customers of five universal banks - 
ADB, HFC, Stanbic, Fidelity and Ecobank; where the sample size was determined by the 
number of experts (with sufficient expertise) within each bank who could potentially participate 
in the study. These five banks were selected because they constitute some of the most popular 
banks in Ghana and were willing to participate in this study. Surveys are often associated with 
the deductive research approach and questionnaire administration (Saunders et al., 2009). The 
customers’ questionnaire had three sections – namely: i) section A had questions related to 
clients’ demography; ii) section B had questions on income level; and iii) section C had 
questions measuring mortgage default propensity (refer to Table 1). 100 responses were received 
constituting a 83.33% response rate and indicating the level of support given from these five 
banks.  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Modelling Mortgage Loan Default Propensity 
The logistics regression method is applied because it is particularly suitable for empirical studies 
with qualitative data, which considers the loan status as a binary (or Boolean) variable that takes 
a value of either zero (for mortgages that are performing) or one (for non-performing 
mortgages). A logistic model formulates the probability of a loan being non-performing as a 
logistic function of some combination of explanatory variables as follows: 
 
𝑃(loan status= 1) = 1/1+𝑒−(𝛼+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2X2+⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘) 
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where 𝑃(loan status = 1) is the probability of a mortgage being non-performing, 𝑋1,𝑋2,... 𝑋𝑘 are 
explanatory variables, factors or predictors that may help determine default risk; 𝛼 is a constant; 
𝛽1, 𝛽2, ... , 𝛽𝑘 are coefficients that capture the impact that each factor may have on default risk; 
and 𝜀 is an error term, which is assumed to be independent and normally distributed. Kleinbaum 
et al. (2008) indicate that logistic regression quantifies the relationship between the dichotomous 
dependent variable and the predictors using odds ratios. Odds ratios are the probability that an 
event will occur divided by the probability that the event will not happen. The odds ratio in this 
study is the probability that a borrower will default on a mortgage loan payment obligation 
divided by the probability that a borrower will not default on a mortgage loan payment 
obligation. Odds are calculated using the formula: 
  
Odds = P (case)/P(non-case) 
= P(X)/ 1 – P(X) 
= [exp(-XT𝛽ሻሿ-1 
 
Where, P(X) is the probability of success (case) and 1 – P(X) is the probability of failure (non 
case). The odds ratio, which is meant to indicate whether the odds of a success (case) are equally 
likely to the odds of failure is given by: 
 
Odds = Odds of cases/ Odds of non-cases 
 
An odds ratio of one is an indication that the odds of a success (case) outcome are equally likely 
for to the odds of a failure (non-case). The odds ratio has a minimum value of zero but have no 
upper limit. A value less than one indicates that the case is not likely to prevail under those 
circumstances and a value greater than one indicates a high likelihood for belonging to the group. 
The further the odds ratio is from one, the stronger the relationship. Rearranging, the resultant 
will be: 
P(X)/ 1 – P(X) = [exp(-XT𝛽ሻሿ-1 
 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides: 
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ln[P(X)/ 1 – P(X)] = -(- XT𝛽ሻ 
ൌ XT𝛽 
ln(Odds) = logit(y) 
= ln[P(X)/ 1 – P(X)] 
 
Where, logit(y) is the natural logarithm of the odds of outcome. The coefficients 𝛽 ൌ ሾ𝛽0, 𝛽1, 
𝛽2,⋯ 𝛽𝑘ሿ are estimated using the maximum likelihood method:  
 
G(X) = ln[P(X)/ 1 – P(X)] = (XT𝛽ሻ 
 
The transformation G(X) is referred to as the logit transformation (Al-Ghamdi, 2001).  
 
4. INITIAL ASSESSMENTS AND RESULTS 
According to Asiedu and Alfen (2016) background knowledge about the respondents to a survey, 
helps to assess the reliability and integrity of the data received and to generate confidence and 
credibility in the results. Tables 2 and 3 reports upon demographic characteristics of the 
respondents. The results indicate that the majority of respondents were male. Barber and Odean 
(2001) reveal that, males often exhibit more confidence than females, which explains that gender 
is worth investigating when studying mortgage choices. Besides, other studies illustrate that 
females are more risk averse, and that explains their reluctance in taking mortgage facilities 
(Borghans et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2006; Dohmen et al., 2011).  
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Similarly, the results show that 66 per cent of the respondents were married. This is intuitive 
given that those who have settled down often plan for permanent homes. This corroborates the 
observation of Finke et al. (2005) who found that households with co-borrowers (e.g. conjugal 
partners) and short expected housing tenures increases the propensity of applying for a mortgage 
facility. With respect to the level of education of respondents, 76 per cent had a minimum of first 
degree. According to Campbell (2006), mortgage refinancing is less successfully purchased by 
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households with a low educational level. Again, their high educational levels guarantee the 
respondents’ understanding of the survey and enhanced credibility. The results on income levels 
shows that the majority (54 per cent) of respondents earn above US$ 500 per month. Fortowsky 
et al. (2009) observed that higher income levels of borrowers increases the likelihood of taking a 
mortgage facility.  
Mortgage Default Propensity: Baseline Results 
Results predicting four measures of default propensity are reported in Table 4. Models one (M1) 
and two (M2) predict borrowers’ previous challenges when repaying any loan and actual default 
on the repayment of any loan respectively. Models three (M3) and four (M4) specifically 
measure borrowers’ previous challenges repaying a mortgage and their actual default on 
mortgage repayment accordingly. Only demographic variables were used in the baseline 
estimations. The results suggest that household size, first degree holders, self-employed 
borrowers and private sector workers are generally negatively correlated with mortgage default 
propensity. In other words, these variables reduce the propensity of mortgage default. However, 
only household size, self-employed borrowers and private sector employees enter the regression 
significantly. Self-employed borrowers and private sector employees are strong and significant 
variables of mortgage default propensity at p = 0.05. Household size is relevant in predicting 
previous challenges in repaying mortgages and previous mortgage defaults at p = 0.10 and 0.05 
significance levels. Household size is however not significant in determining previous challenges 
in repaying other loan types and previous defaults on other loans. Working in the private sector 
is also not a significant factor in predicting actual defaults on other loan types. 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
On the contrary, age, Higher National Diploma holders, females and unmarried (single) 
borrowers are positively associated with mortgage defaults. However, females are only 
significant in predicting previous challenges in other loan repayment and actual defaults of other 
loans, and not mortgages. With the exception of actual defaults on other loans, unmarried 
(single) borrowers are powerfully and significantly associated with previous challenges in 
repaying other loans and mortgages as well as defaulting on mortgage repayments. Age is only 
significant in predicting both previous challenges in repaying other loans and mortgages. Being 
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female is significantly associated with previous challenges in repaying other loans and defaults 
on other loans but not mortgages. Holding a Higher National Diploma is consistently 
insignificant with the direction of the relationship changing depending on the variable predicted.  
 
The baseline results further suggest that females are more likely to face challenges in repaying 
other loans and default on other loans than males. Self-employed and private sector employees 
are less likely to face challenges in repaying other loans and mortgages, and default on other 
loans and mortgages when compared with public sector employees. Unmarried borrowers are 
more likely to face challenges in repaying other loans and mortgages, and default on mortgages 
than married borrowers. The baseline models are improved by incorporating five categories of 
additional variables. Financial literacy (refer to Tables 5-8) affects the likelihood of mortgage 
default. Two variables – savings and budgeting – are used as proxies for financial literacy. 
Savings could serve as emergency funds for unplanned expenditures and expenses. The savings 
dimension is defined by four questions bordering on borrowers’ knowledge and ownership of an 
emergency fund such as a savings account and their ability to calculate the interest accruing to 
their accounts. The budget dimension measures borrower’s ability to set up a personal budget 
and to track various components such as expenditures. This dimension also explores borrowers’ 
budgetary allocations to basic needs like food, housing and clothing.  
 
Measures of risk tolerance are also included in the models. The risk tolerance level of borrowers 
is measured by their response to a question about how they perceive themselves in relation to 
risk and return profiles of investments. A scale measuring risk tolerance levels ranging from one 
to four is used in this regard (representing the most risk averse and the most risk tolerant 
borrowers respectively).  
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
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To deal with multicollinearity, the 11 variables measuring financial literacy and the 1 variable 
measuring risk tolerance are alternatively included in model. The results indicate that savings 
and budgetary proxies for financial literacy are significantly associated with the likelihood of 
mortgage default. This is however not the case in explaining defaults on other types of loans 
(with the exception of budgetary allocations to clothing). Most of the savings and budgetary 
proxies are positively correlated with the likelihood of mortgage default. In terms of explaining 
previous challenges in repaying other types of loans, budgetary allocations to food and housing 
are negatively linked but insignificant. Similarly, two savings proxies namely, ownerships of an 
emergency fund and knowledge of how to calculate interest rates are not relevant in predicting 
previous challenges in repaying other loans. The relationship between some of the variables, for 
instance, ownership of an emergency fund and the likelihood of mortgage default alternate in 
terms of direction of effect depending upon the variable used in measuring mortgage default. So, 
contrary to the likelihood of mortgage default in terms of previous challenges in repaying other 
loans, the relationship between ownership of an emergency fund and default on other loans turns 
negative.  
 
The next set of regressions incorporates seven macroeconomic measures and three measures of 
borrowers’ perception of the main constraints to accessing mortgage finance (refer to Tables 9 to 
12). Again, the direction of the relationship between the macroeconomic variables and the 
likelihood of mortgage default alternates in relation to the indicator used. The results show that 
most of the variables are not statistically relevant. Only the national savings rate and the 
exchange rate enters significantly in explaining previous challenges in repaying other loans and 
mortgages respectively. Besides national savings rate and exchange rate, inflation rate is also 
relevant in predicting default on mortgage loans. All the three measures of the perceived 
constraints to mortgage access are consistently positive and significant in predicting most of the 
indicators of mortgage default likelihood. The only exception is in relation to explaining defaults 
on other loans.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 9 HERE>> 
<<INSERT TABLE 10 HERE>> 
<<INSERT TABLE 11 HERE>> 
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<<INSERT TABLE 12 HERE>> 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The logistics regression analyses show that demographic characteristics of borrowers, their level 
of financial literacy, perception of macroeconomic performance, risk tolerance level and the 
constraints borrowers’ face in accessing mortgages are associated with the likelihood of 
mortgage default in different directions and magnitudes.  
 
Demographics for Credit Default  
The study found that gender, age, and the sector in which a borrower works are major 
determinant of loan default. Older unmarried females who work in the public sector are more 
likely to default on credit facilities than their younger male and female counterparts. 
Demographic-differences with respect to credit repayment-rates are a long-standing debate. 
Particularly, gender-differences have been highlighted in extant literature (Borghans et al., 2009; 
Harris et al., 2006; Dohmen et al., 2011; Weber et al., 2002; Lundeberg et al. 1994). Contrary to 
our findings, men are traditionally more likely to default on credit facilities (Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek, 1998). This is because men generally take more risk that could lead to them to default 
on a credit facility. Men tend to accumulate more debt than women and default on mortgages 
more often (Khandker et. al. 1995; Hulme 1991; Kevane and Wydick 2001). Further, older 
people are usually more responsible and have relatively higher incomes than younger people and 
hence, are less likely to default (Thomas, 2000; Boyle et. al. 1992) 
 
However, these findings can be best understood when reference is provided to general facts that 
are internationally accepted and the Ghanaian context. Internationally, women earn less than men 
(Blau and Kahn, 1996) and thus, reduce their relative ability to afford credit. Low incomes may 
be due to low educational attainments, which is positively associated with credit defaults 
according to this study. Higher National Diploma (HND) holders are more likely to default than 
degree holders. In addition, where a person works in terms of sector determines their earning 
capacity. Private sector employees generally earn more because private sector firms are often 
more productive and more likely to pay more to retain a productive employee who is likely to 
have higher educational attainments. Therefore, it is possible that most of the females surveyed 
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have lower educational attainments (HND holders), work in the public sector and earn less which 
in turn increases their likelihood to default on credit. This situation may be compounded if the 
females are single parents with responsibilities towards not only their immediate nuclear family 
(children) but also the extended family.  
 
The result is however consistent with the view that the marital status of the borrower is a relevant 
determinant of the likelihood to default. Between married and single people (including divorced 
people), the latter has a higher chance of defaulting. This could be due to the fact that married 
people are usually more responsible than single people, particularly in terms of nuclear family 
responsibilities. These responsibilities are likely to deter them from opportunistic behaviours that 
could result in credit default, and in the case of mortgage default, could result in the loss of their 
homes with varying social consequences. These responsibilities and ramifications if not 
honoured therefore, serve as a discipline device that mitigates credit defaults.  
 
Financial Literacy and Credit Default 
Financial literacy is also a major determinant of credit default. Although general literacy level is 
high in Ghana, financial literacy is low. Boamah (2011) indicates that only 20 per cent of the 
Ghanaian population is bankable; out of which only 10 per cent have bank accounts. Further, less 
than 10 percentage of the population can afford to have a mortgage loan. In effect, the majority 
of Ghanaians are not used to regular debt servicing obligations (Karley, 2002; Ansah, 1996). 
Therefore, financially literate borrowers who have savings accounts possess corporate finance 
skills (such as the ability to calculate interests earned on investments and budgeting skills) have 
comparatively lower chances of defaulting than those who lack these characteristics (French and 
McKillop, 2014). Besides facilitating a better understanding of credit obligations, higher 
educational attainments are also correlated with a borrower’s savings behaviour and budgeting 
skills, which are important money management skills.   
 
Macroeconomic Instability and Credit Default 
The study confirms earlier studies that establish a link between macroeconomic instability and 
credit market development. A low national savings rate and price instability, typified by 
excessive movements in exchange rate and inflation, are relevant drivers of credit default. It is 
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well established that macroeconomic instability heightens the perceive risk of default and thus 
distorts price signals. This results in high inflation risk and interest rate risk premiums that 
increase interest rates and exacerbate credit affordability, which increases default. Historically, 
Ghana’s macroeconomic environment has been characterised by high fluctuations in gross 
domestic product and exchange rates, high inflation rate and interest rates (Boamah, 2012). The 
1990s for instance were typical of these characteristics with inflation rising up to 70 per cent and 
interest rates about 40 per cent. Consequently, only a few rich or highly paid workers could 
access credit. It is also one of the reasons that discourage commercial banks from participating in 
the mortgage market, hence its under-developed nature.  
 
Credit Access Constraints and Default 
It is well known that high and volatile interest rates, high collateral requirements and loan size 
are some of the constraints to accessing credit facilities. In this study, the borrower’ perceptions 
about these factors as constraints to credit access are shown to be major predictors of credit 
default. As indicated above, high and volatile interest rates increase default tendencies in an 
economy that is characterised by low-income levels. Collateral is an alternative instrument to 
information for signalling borrower quality and internalizing externalities like losses due to 
default. So, it is normal that collateral requirements are high in a highly information asymmetric 
environment such as the Ghanaian economy. Further, average house prices in Ghana are 
expensive and require large loan amounts that are beyond the reach of most people. Thus, large 
loan amounts of finance are associated with higher chances of default.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study has assessed the determinants of the propensity of credit default using survey data 
from Ghana. The data was collected from customers of four commercial banks using semi-
structured questionnaires. Using logistics regression analysis, the study shows that demographic 
and financial factors as well as borrowers’ perception about the macroeconomic and constraints 
to credit access are major determinants of credit default propensity. In particular, unmarried 
older females workers in the public sector with lower education attainments are more prone to 
credit default than their younger female and male counterparts, who are married and more 
educated. Also, savings and budgetary ability proxies for financial literacy are powerfully 
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associated with credit default. Higher levels of financial literacy are shown to reduce a 
borrower’s chances of defaulting. Macroeconomic factors like inflation, exchange rate and 
national savings rate are relevant in explaining borrower default behaviour. These findings are 
important for two main reasons. First, the study is of theoretical value and adds to the extant 
literature. For instance, contrary to established wisdom, females were found to be more likely to 
default given low educational attainments, been unmarried and possibly earning a low income. 
Second, the study is of practical value to credit officers and the development of the credit market 
in Ghana. The research is however limited to those banks studied and further research could 
expand the study to include many more commercial banks.  
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Table 1 - Label Variables and Definitions 
Construct Variable Variable Definition 
 
 
 
 
 
Default risk 
(Dependent 
variable) 
 Dummy = 1 if the borrower has ever had a challenge repaying any loan facility, 
and 0 if otherwise 
 Dummy = 1 if the borrower has Have ever defaulted on a loan facility, or 0 if 
otherwise 
 Dummy = 1 if the borrower has any challenge repaying his/her mortgage, or 0 if 
otherwise 
 Dummy = 1 if borrower has ever missed any monthly payment of mortgage, or 0 
if otherwise 
 Dummy = 1 if borrower thinks he/she could fully complete payment of mortgage, 
or 0 if otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographics 
Gender Dummy = 1 if male, and 0 if female 
Education 
level 
Dummy = 1 if 1st degree holder, and 0 if 2nd and 3rd degree holder, HND holder, 
SHS leaver; 1 if 2nd degree holder, and 0 if 1st degree holder, HND holder, SHS 
leaver 
Employment 
status 
Dummy = 1 if employee of public sector, and 0 if employee of private sector, self-
employed; 1 if employee of private sector, and 0 if employee of public sector, 
self-employed; 1 if self-employed, and 0 if employee of public sector, employee 
of private sector 
Marital status  Dummy = 1 if married, and 0 if single, divorced/separated; 1 if single, and 0 if 
married, divorced/separated; 1 if divorced/separated, and 0 if married, single 
Household 
size 
Number of people in a household 
Age Number of years, measured as an interval: < 25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, >55 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial literacy 
Budgeting Dummy = 1 if borrower knows how to set up a personal budget, or 0 if otherwise 
Dummy = 1 if borrower has a personal budget, and 0 if otherwise 
Dummy = 1 if borrower has a household budget, 0 if otherwise 
Dummy = 1 if borrower is able to track your household expenditure, and 0 if 
otherwise 
Savings Dummy = 1 if borrower knows how to calculate interest rates on accounts, and 0 
if otherwise 
Dummy = 1 if borrower knows he should have save, and 0 if otherwise 
Dummy = 1 if borrower saves, and 0 if otherwise 
Dummy = 1 if borrower is aware of some of the existing formal savings 
mechanisms, and 0 if otherwise 
 
Household budget 
Housing 
budget  
Percentage of income spent on housing 
Food budget Percentage of income spent on food 
Clothing 
budget 
Percentage of income spent on clothing 
Household wealth Income Monthly gross salary from employment in US dollars, measured as an interval:  
250-500, 500-750, 750-1,000, 1,000-1,250, >1,250 
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Macroeconomic  
Effects 
Interest rates Five-point scale measure of a borrower’s belief of the adverse effect of interest 
rates movements on mortgage default. Scale: 1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-
indifferent, 4-agree, and 5-strongly agree. 
Inflation rate  Five-point scale measure of a borrower’s belief of the adverse effect of inflation 
rates movements on mortgage default. Scale: 1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-
indifferent, 4-agree, and 5-strongly agree. 
Exchange rates Five-point scale measure of a borrower’s belief of the adverse effect of exchange 
rates movements on mortgage default. Scale: 1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-
indifferent, 4-agree, and 5-strongly agree. 
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Table 2 -  Parameter Estimate and Statistics: Socio-demographic Characteristic.  
 Me
an 
Me
dia
n 
Mo
de 
Sta
nda
rd 
Err
or 
Mi
nim
um
 
Ma
xim
um
 
Co
unt
 
Demographics        
Household Size 1.330 1.000 1.000 0.055 1.000 3.000 100 
Gender: Male 0.568 1.000 1.000 0.055 0.000 1.000 81 
Gender: Female 0.444 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 1.000 81 
Age 2.679 2.000 2.000 0.096 1.000 5.000 81 
Education Level: 1st Degree 0.556 1.000 1.000 0.056 0.000 1.000 81 
Educational Level: 2nd Degree 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.000 1.000 81 
Educational Level: HND 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.000 1.000 81 
Employer: Public Sector 0.605 1.000 1.000 0.055 0.000 1.000 81 
Employer: Private Sector 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.000 1.000 81 
Employer: Self Employed 0.136 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 1.000 81 
Marital Status: Married 0.716 1.000 1.000 0.050 0.000 1.000 81 
Marital Status: Single 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.000 1.000 81 
Marital Status: Divorced 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 1.000 81 
Financial Literacy        
Savings 1 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.000 2.000 100 
Savings 2 0.630 1.000 0.000 0.065 0.000 2.000 100 
Savings 3 0.440 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.000 2.000 100 
Savings 4 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.000 2.000 100 
Budgeting 1 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.000 2.000 100 
Budgeting 2 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.000 2.000 100 
Budgeting 3 0.520 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.000 2.000 100 
Budgeting 4 0.620 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000 2.000 100 
Budgeting Proportion: Housing  34.821 30.000 30.000 1.931 10.000 75.000 56 
Budgeting Proportion: Food 44.754 45.000 50.000 1.722 10.000 80.000 57 
Budgeting Proportion: Clothing 21.035 20.000 20.000 1.266 5.000 50.000 57 
Risk Aversion        
Risk Tolerance Level 2.340 2.000 3.000 0.103 1.000 4.000 100 
Income Level        
Monthly Salary 2.920 3.000 2.000 0.110 2.000 6.000 100 
Perception about Economic 
Factors 
       
Interest Rate 3.500 4.000 5.000 0.147 1.000 5.000 100 
Inflation 3.150 3.000 4.000 0.135 1.000 5.000 100 
Exchange Rate 3.340 4.000 4.000 0.122 1.000 5.000 100 
National Growth Rate 3.170 3.000 3.000 0.109 1.000 5.000 100 
National Savings Habit 3.300 3.000 3.000 0.111 1.000 5.000 100 
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Employment Rate 3.540 4.000 5.000 0.140 1.000 5.000 100 
Default Propensity        
Previous challenge repaying 
any loan facility 
0.630 1.000 0.000 0.065 0.000 2.000 100 
Previous defaults on a loan 
facility 
0.950 1.000 1.000 0.054 0.000 2.000 100 
Previous challenge repaying a 
mortgage 
0.740 1.000 1.000 0.061 0.000 2.000 100 
Previously missed any monthly 
payment of mortgage 
0.810 1.000 1.000 0.060 0.000 2.000 100 
Ability to fully complete 
payment of mortgage 
0.340 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.000 2.000 100 
Mortgage Access Constraints        
Interest rate 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.000 2.000 100 
Collateral security 0.270 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.000 2.000 100 
Loan size 0.330 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.000 2.000 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 - Respondents Demographic Profile 
Description Frequency Proportion (%) 
Age 
< 25 
26-35 
36-45 
46-55 
>55 
 
3 
51 
30 
13 
3 
 
3 
51 
30 
13 
3 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
 
55 
45 
 
55 
45 
Marital Status 
Divorced/Separated 
Marital 
Single 
 
 
5 
66 
                 29 
 
5 
66 
29 
Educational Level 
Below HND 
Technician/HND 
Bachelor 
Master 
Doctorate 
 
 
3 
21 
55 
20 
1 
 
3 
21 
55 
20 
1 
Income Levels (US$ per 
month) 
250-500 
500-750 
750-1,000 
1,000-1,250 
>1,250 
 
46 
30 
14 
6 
4 
 
46 
30 
14 
6 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table   4 - Baseline Logistics Regression 
Table 4 presents baseline logistic regression estimations of mortgage default propensity measured by four different but related variables. Models one (M1) and 
two (M2) predict borrowers’ previous challenges repaying any loan and actual default on the repayment of any loan respectively.  Models three (M3) and four 
(M4) specially measure borrowers’ previous challenges repaying a mortgage and their actual default on mortgage repayment accordingly. Only demographic 
variables are included as independent variables in the baseline regressions. They are household size, age, gender dummy, education dummies, employment 
dummies and marital status dummy. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 
Household Size -0.581 -0.313 -0.854* -1.306** 
-0.443 -0.583 -0.469 -0.522 
Female: Dummy 1.050** 1.432** 0.212 0.855 
-0.497 -0.641 -0.502 -0.562 
Age 0.780** -0.026 0.605* 0.65 
-0.339 -0.376 -0.364 -0.397 
First Degree: Dummy  -0.468 -0.651 0.149 0.062 
-0.651 -0.863 -0.669 -0.708 
Higher National Diploma: Dummy 0.056 -0.631 -0.062 -0.472 
-0.752 -0.931 -0.769 -0.799 
Self Employed  -1.113*** -1.478* -2.316*** -2.048** 
-0.586 -0.798 -0.803 -0.811 
Private Sector Employee -2.075*** -0.992 -1.330** -1.578** 
-0.785 -0.686 -0.595 -0.658 
Marital Status: Single 2.161*** 0.455 2.113*** 2.816*** 
-0.654 -0.741 -0.716 -0.905 
Constant -1.487 2.355 0.162 0.818 
-1.327 -1.688 -1.365 -1.445 
  
Table 5 - Financial Literacy, Risk Tolerance and Previous Challenges Repaying Other Loans 
 M1 M2 M3  M4 M5  M6 M7 M8  M9 M10 M11 M12 
Household Size -0.631 
(0.467) 
-0.578 
(0.446) 
-0.478 
(0.457) 
-0.489 
(0.448) 
-0.428 
(0.453) 
-0.603 
(0.456) 
-0.700 
(0.476) 
-0.527 
(0.460) 
-0.596 
(0.448) 
-0.558 
(0.448) 
-0.685 
(0.462) 
-0.545 
(0.451) 
Female: Dummy 0.715 
(0.531) 
0.978** 
(0.504) 
0.792 
(0.520) 
0.876* 
(0.512) 
0.821 
(0.516) 
0.951* 
(0.512) 
0.886* 
(0.518) 
0.770 
(0.517) 
1.046** 
(0.503) 
1.075** 
(0.498) 
1.090** 
(0.512) 
1.062** 
(0.499) 
Age 0.809** 
(0.344) 
0.754** 
(0.339) 
0.725** 
(0.341) 
0.768** 
(0.340) 
0.821** 
(0.339) 
0.765** 
(0.344) 
0.748** 
(0.340) 
0.734** 
(0.337) 
0.788** 
(0.341) 
0.777** 
(0.339) 
0.780** 
(0.342) 
0.771** 
(0.340) 
First Degree: Dummy  -0.690 
(0.671) 
-0.537 
(0.660) 
-0.682 
(0.676) 
-0.530 
(0.658) 
-0.475 
(0.659) 
-0.680 
(0.676) 
-0.774 
(0.685) 
-0.627 
(0.670) 
-0.442 
(0.653) 
-0.525 
(0.660) 
-0.738 
(0.691) 
-0.445 
(0.656) 
Higher National Diploma: 
Dummy 
-0.606 
(0.826) 
-0.072 
(0.765) 
-0.304 
(0.801) 
-0.154 
(0.771) 
-0.140 
(0.785) 
-0.217 
(0.782) 
-0.599 
(0.820) 
-0.189 
(0.785) 
0.043 
(0.757) 
0.016 
(0.761) 
-0.218 
(0.784) 
0.081 
(0.757) 
Self Employed  -2.085** 
(0.867) 
-2.120*** 
(0.787) 
-2.180*** 
(0.824) 
-2.139*** 
(0.802) 
-2.139*** 
(0.816) 
-2.169*** 
(0.818) 
-2.068** 
(0.828) 
-1.999** 
(0.794) 
-2.067*** 
(0.787) 
-2.104*** 
(0.794) 
-2.132** 
(0.828) 
-2.090*** 
(0.787) 
Private Sector Employee -1.291** 
(0.631) 
-1.176** 
(0.599) 
-1.181** 
(0.614) 
-1.029* 
(0.593) 
-1.065* 
(0.597) 
-1.153** 
(0.607) 
-1.217** 
(0.615) 
-1.248** 
(0.621) 
-1.044* 
(0.593) 
-1.131** 
(0.586) 
-0.957 
(0.595) 
-1.107* 
(0.586) 
Marital Status: Single 2.249*** 
(0.725) 
1.998*** 
(0.676) 
2.009*** 
(0.695) 
2.028*** 
(0.672) 
2.043*** 
(0.679) 
1.989*** 
(0.674) 
1.916*** 
(0.697) 
1.937*** 
(0.674) 
2.196*** 
(0.662) 
2.165*** 
(0.652) 
2.293*** 
(0.671) 
2.138 
(0.655) 
Knowledge of Need for 
Emergency Funds: Dummy 
2.126*** 
(0.780) 
           
Ownership of Emergency 
Fund: Dummy 
 0.417 
(0.435) 
          
Knowledge of where to 
keep emergency fund 
  1.177** 
(0.515) 
         
Knowledge of how to 
calculate interest rates 
   0.716 
(0.471) 
        
Knowledge of how to set up 
personal budgets 
    1.200** 
(0.607) 
       
Ownership of a personal 
budget  
     1.036** 
(0.509) 
      
Ownership of a household 
budget  
      1.303** 
(0.503) 
     
Ability to track household 
expenditure 
       1.006** 
(0.417) 
    
Percentage of housing 
budget 
        -0.022 
(0.023) 
   
Percentage of food budget          -0.019 
(0.025) 
  
Percentage of clothing 
budget 
          0.073** 
(0.039) 
 
Description            -0.099 
(0.239) 
  
Constant -1.428 
(1.384) 
-1.497 
(1.335) 
-1.483 
(1.374) 
-1.699 
(1.356) 
-1.893 
(1.368) 
-1.489 
(1.366) 
-1.330 
(1.375) 
-1.638 
(1.371) 
-0.763 
(1.527) 
-0.641 
(1.744) 
-2.764* 
(1.538) 
-1.305 
(1.400) 
 
 
  
Table 6 - Financial Literacy, Risk Tolerance and Defaults on Other Loans 
 M1 M2 M3  M4 M5  M6 M7 M8  M9 M10 M11 M12 
Household Size -0.311 
(0.577) 
-0.311 
(0.584) 
-0.290 
(0.587) 
-0.291 
(0.582) 
-0.282 
(0.590) 
-0.307 
(0.582) 
-0.306 
(0.585) 
-0.252 
(0.588) 
-0.324 
(0.587) 
-0.277 
(0.573) 
-0.407 
(0.589) 
-0.347 
(0.589) 
Female: Dummy 1.326** 
(0.659) 
1.467** 
(0.655) 
1.389** 
(0.663) 
1.388** 
(0.654) 
1.385** 
(0.660) 
1.362** 
(0.649) 
1.484** 
(0.654) 
1.257** 
(0.654) 
1.432** 
(0.647) 
1.489** 
(0.644) 
1.467** 
(0.660) 
1.412** 
(0.642) 
Age -0.039 
(0.373) 
-0.011 
(0.381) 
-0.043 
(0.380) 
-0.046 
(0.378) 
-0.024 
(0.374) 
-0.076 
(0.382) 
-0.009 
(0.381) 
-0.092 
(0.374) 
-0.058 
(0.376) 
-0.048 
(0.378) 
-0.090 
(0.384) 
-0.008 
(0.379) 
First Degree: Dummy  -0.698 
(0.863) 
-0.626 
(0.868) 
-0.679 
(0.870) 
-0.680 
(0.868) 
-0.650 
(0.861) 
-0.779 
(0.881) 
-0.613 
(0.872) 
-0.723 
(0.866) 
-0.669 
(0.870) 
-0.716 
(0.863) 
-1.036 
(0.914) 
-0.686 
(0.868) 
Higher National Diploma: Dummy -0.754 
(0.954) 
-0.585 
(0.946) 
-0.665 
(0.942) 
-0.699 
(0.953) 
-0.645 
(0.933) 
-0.750 
(0.950) 
-0.537 
(0.956) 
-0.672 
(0.944) 
-0.657 
(0.937) 
-0.675 
(0.931) 
-0.928 
(0.961) 
-0.657 
(0.933) 
Self Employed  -1.400* 
(0.814) 
-1.473* 
(0.796) 
-1.470* 
(0.801) 
-1.484* 
(0.803) 
-1.465* 
(0.803) 
-1.478* 
(0.812) 
-1.528* 
(0.805) 
-1.420* 
(0.814) 
-1.492* 
(0.798) 
-1.497* 
(0.809) 
-1.566* 
(0.832) 
-1.447* 
(0.800) 
Private Sector Employee -1.006 
(0.685) 
-0.982 
(0.689) 
-0.991 
(0.684) 
-0.976 
(0.685) 
-0.982 
(0.685) 
-0.991 
(0.684) 
-0.989 
(0.690) 
-1.035 
(0.683) 
-0.942 
(0.691) 
-1.050 
(0.703) 
-0.813 
(0.696) 
-0.978 
(0.690) 
Marital Status: Single 0.425 
(0.750) 
0.514 
(0.774) 
0.417 
(0.757) 
0.385 
(0.767) 
0.416 
(0.754) 
0.287 
(0.762) 
0.546 
(0.772) 
0.245 
(0.765) 
0.502 
(0.753) 
0.383 
(0.743) 
0.579 
(0.767) 
0.504 
(0.752) 
Knowledge of Need for Emergency Funds: 
Dummy 
0.536 
(0.835) 
           
Ownership of Emergency Fund: Dummy  -0.145 
(0.545) 
          
Knowledge of where to keep emergency fund   0.147 
(0.590) 
         
Knowledge of how to calculate interest rates    0.203 
(0.596) 
        
Knowledge of how to set up personal budgets     0.195 
(0.720) 
       
Ownership of a personal budget       0.587 
(0.661) 
      
Ownership of a household budget        -0.233 
(0.546) 
     
Ability to track household expenditure        0.613 
(0.547) 
    
Percentage of housing budget         -0.012 
(0.028) 
   
Percentage of food budget          -0.028 
(0.033) 
  
Percentage of clothing budget           0.090* 
(0.052) 
 
Description            0.126 
(0.289) 
  
Constant 2.397 
(1.685) 
2.340 
(1.690) 
2.372 
(1.689) 
2.369 
(1.689) 
2.292 
(1.697) 
2.476 
(1.708) 
2.330 
(1.692) 
2.341 
(1.695) 
2.812 
(1.998) 
3.682 
(2.293) 
 2.079 
(1.794) 
 
 
  
Table 7- Financial Literacy, Risk Tolerance and Previous Challenges Repaying Mortgages 
 M1 M2 M3  M4 M5  M6 M7 M8  M9 M10 M11 M12 
Household Size -0.980** 
(0.508) 
-0.870* 
(0.496) 
-0.763 
(0.491) 
-0.728 
(0.472) 
-0.689 
(0.482) 
-0.904* 
(0.504) 
-0.918* 
(0.495) 
-0.822 
(0.527) 
-0.923* 
(0.487) 
-0.902* 
(0.477) 
-0.918* 
(0.477) 
-0.967** 
(0.492) 
Female: Dummy -0.298 
(0.566) 
0.015 
(0.535) 
-0.175 
(0.544) 
-0.049 
(0.529) 
-0.191 
(0.543) 
-0.036 
(0.539) 
0.050 
(0.522) 
-0.346 
(0.565) 
0.195 
(0.525) 
0.212 
(0.507) 
0.189 
(0.509) 
0.190 
(0.504) 
Age 0.595 
(0.367) 
0.532 
(0.361) 
0.478 
(0.360) 
0.574 
(0.360) 
0.625* 
(0.357) 
0.554 
(0.368) 
0.542 
(0.357) 
0.519 
(0.367) 
0.610 
(0.373) 
0.616* 
(0.367) 
0.578 
(0.364) 
0.652* 
(0.371) 
First Degree: Dummy  -0.059 
(0.704) 
-0.048 
(0.705) 
-0.183 
(0.708) 
0.099 
(0.680) 
0.152 
(0.683) 
-0.132 
(0.709) 
-0.095 
(0.690) 
-0.033 
(0.725) 
0.256 
(0.695) 
0.223 
(0.680) 
0.012 
(0.688) 
0.096 
(0.671) 
Higher National Diploma: 
Dummy 
-1.089 
(0.910) 
-0.524 
(0.814) 
-0.725 
(0.873) 
-0.422 
(0.809) 
-0.445 
(0.844) 
-0.587 
(0.842) 
-0.663 
(0.840) 
-0.557 
(0.869) 
-0.064 
(0.783) 
-0.017 
(0.773) 
-0.214 
(0.788) 
-0.128 
(0.772) 
Self Employed  -2.829*** 
(1.024) 
-2.580*** 
(0.838) 
-2.701*** 
(0.921) 
-2.516*** 
(0.854) 
-2.734*** 
(0.924) 
-2.660*** 
(0.900) 
-2.267*** 
(0.830) 
-2.496*** 
(0.866) 
-2.400*** 
(0.837) 
-2.342*** 
(0.806) 
-2.294*** 
(0.828) 
-2.347*** 
(0.804) 
Private Sector Employee -1.623** 
(0.668) 
-1.585** 
(0.649) 
-1.478** 
(0.640) 
-1.218** 
(0.604) 
-1.284** 
(0.614) 
-1.427** 
(0.634) 
-1.403** 
(0.615) 
-1.736** 
(0.695) 
-1.206** 
(0.602) 
-1.330** 
(0.599) 
-1.203** 
(0.597) 
-1.373** 
(0.605) 
Marital Status: Single 2.360*** 
(0.857) 
1.645** 
(0.757) 
1.963** 
(0.783) 
1.863** 
(0.735) 
2.063*** 
(0.779) 
1.888** 
(0.764) 
1.807** 
(0.747) 
1.749** 
(0.755) 
2.248*** 
(0.742) 
2.151*** 
(0.723) 
2.165*** 
(0.723) 
2.263*** 
(0.751) 
Knowledge of Need for 
Emergency Funds: Dummy 
3.601*** 
(1.227) 
           
Ownership of Emergency 
Fund: Dummy 
 1.303** 
(0.530) 
          
Knowledge of where to 
keep emergency fund 
  0.492*** 
(1.454) 
         
Knowledge of how to 
calculate interest rates 
   1.139** 
(0.563) 
        
Knowledge of how to set up 
personal budgets 
    2.113** 
(0.862) 
       
Ownership of a personal 
budget  
     1.809*** 
(0.663) 
      
Ownership of a household 
budget  
      1.157** 
(0.524) 
     
Ability to track household 
expenditure 
       1.893*** 
(0.559) 
    
Percentage of housing 
budget 
        -0.049** 
(0.025) 
   
Percentage of food budget          0.023 
(0.026) 
  
Percentage of clothing 
budget 
          0.048 
(0.040) 
 
Description            0.236 
(0.260) 
  
Constant 0.544 
(1.457) 
0.224 
(1.420) 
0.492 
(1.454) 
-0.083 
(1.393) 
-0.175 
(1.410) 
0.345 
(1.446) 
0.361 
(1.407) 
0.151 
(1.477) 
1.902 
(1.667) 
-0.845 
(1.806) 
-0.611 
(1.538) 
-0.299 
(1.458) 
 
 
 
  
Table 8 - Financial Literacy, Risk Tolerance and Defaults on Other Loans 
 M1 M2 M3  M4 M5  M6 M7 M8  M9 M10 M11 M12 
Household Size -1.369** 
(0.545) 
-1.333** 
(0.546) 
-1.197** 
(0.540) 
-1.191** 
(0.534) 
-1.166** 
(0.525) 
-1.300** 
(0.535) 
-1.408** 
(0.558) 
-1.193** 
(0.557) 
-1.320** 
(0.525) 
-1.291** 
(0.525) 
-1.332** 
(0.525) 
-1.251** 
(0.530) 
Female: Dummy 0.608 
(0.603) 
0.735 
(0.596) 
0.535 
(0.598) 
0.584 
(0.614) 
0.635 
(0.581) 
0.722 
(0.577) 
0.761 
(0.594) 
0.422 
(0.609) 
0.869 
(0.568) 
0.851 
(0.561) 
0.843 
(0.564) 
0.877 
(0.567) 
Age 0.561 
(0.388) 
0.536 
(0.389) 
0.431 
(0.385) 
0.518 
(0.392) 
0.612 
(0.383) 
0.588 
(0.395) 
0.541 
(0.385) 
0.466 
(0.385) 
0.648 
(0.398) 
0.645 
(0.397) 
0.628 
(0.397) 
0.629 
(0.399) 
First Degree: Dummy  -0.172 
(0.727) 
-0.152 
(0.740) 
-0.387 
(0.749) 
-0.093 
(0.748) 
0.007 
(0.704) 
-0.128 
(0.724) 
-0.257 
(0.734) 
-0.121 
(0.747) 
0.081 
(0.716) 
0.044 
(0.711) 
-0.015 
(0.724) 
0.095 
(0.713) 
Higher National Diploma: 
Dummy 
-1.323 
(0.915) 
-0.933 
(0.842) 
-1.191 
(0.909) 
-1.235 
(0.916) 
-0.666 
(0.830) 
-0.746 
(0.829) 
-1.232 
(0.890) 
-0.836 
(0.878) 
-0.496 
(0.804) 
-0.484 
(0.800) 
-0.568 
(0.820) 
-0.448 
(0.803) 
Self Employed  -2.177** 
(0.964) 
-2.310*** 
(0.861) 
-2.388** 
(0.960) 
-2.743*** 
(1.036) 
-2.169** 
(0.863) 
-2.114** 
(0.848) 
-1.985** 
(0.867) 
-2.081** 
(0.872) 
-2.040** 
(0.814) 
-2.042** 
(0.812) 
-1.999** 
(0.821) 
-2.040** 
(0.814) 
Private Sector Employee -1.768** 
(0.698) 
-1.770** 
(0.698) 
-1.732** 
(0.695) 
-1.550** 
(0.694) 
-1.522** 
(0.658) 
-1.574** 
(0.667) 
-1.735** 
(0.692) 
-1.799** 
(0.716) 
-1.524 
(0.662) 
-1.579** 
(0.657) 
-1.502** 
(0.666) 
-1.574** 
(0.656) 
Marital Status: Single 3.007*** 
(0.997) 
2.116** 
(0.954) 
2.792*** 
(0.985) 
2.549*** 
(0.947) 
2.727*** 
(0.930) 
2.619*** 
(0.925) 
2.501*** 
(0.945) 
2.404** 
(0.937) 
2.857*** 
(0.911) 
2.800*** 
(0.907) 
2.839*** 
(0.909) 
2.739*** 
(0.912) 
Knowledge of Need for 
Emergency Funds: Dummy 
2.907** 
(1.174) 
           
Ownership of Emergency 
Fund: Dummy 
 1.289** 
(0.570) 
          
Knowledge of where to keep 
emergency fund 
  1.991** 
(0.776) 
         
Knowledge of how to 
calculate interest rates 
   2.329*** 
(0.819) 
        
Knowledge of how to set up 
personal budgets 
    1.172 
(0.776) 
       
Ownership of a personal 
budget  
     1.061* 
(0.626) 
      
Ownership of a household 
budget  
      1.506** 
(0.625) 
     
Ability to track household 
expenditure 
       1.700*** 
(0.583) 
    
Percentage of housing budget         -0.016 
(0.027) 
   
Percentage of food budget          -0.007 
(0.029) 
  
Percentage of clothing budget           0.022 
(0.040) 
 
Description            -0.146 
(0.273) 
Constant 1.238 0.972 1.394 0.827 0.694 0.926 1.173 0.917 1.374 1.143 0.475 1.122 
  
(1.511) (1.491) (1.549) (1.523) (1.452) (1.475) (1.498) (1.514) (1.740) (1.967) (1.579) (1.559) 
 
 
  
Table 9: Macroeconomic Performance, Credit Access Constraints and Previous Challenges Repaying Other Loans 
 M1 M2 M3  M4 M5  M6 M7 M8  M9 M10 
Household Size -0.572 
(0.444) 
-0.588 
(0.444) 
-0.591 
(0.444) 
-0.556 
(0.448) 
-0.613 
(0.450) 
-0.754 
(0.469) 
-0.642 
(0.454) 
-0.447 
(0.458) 
-0.455 
(0.461) 
-0.565 
(0.460) 
Female: Dummy 0.980** 
(0.502) 
1.068** 
(0.500) 
1.070** 
(0.500) 
1.092** 
(0.512) 
0.978** 
(0.510) 
1.039** 
(0.516) 
1.031** 
(0.499) 
0.695 
(0.531) 
0.614 
(0.537) 
0.691 
(0.526) 
Age 0.823** 
(0.347) 
0.797** 
(0.341) 
0.762** 
(0.344) 
0.783** 
(0.339) 
0.778** 
(0.340) 
0.748** 
(0.348) 
0.815** 
(0.345) 
0.790** 
(0.346) 
0.711** 
(0.349) 
0.809** 
(0.339) 
First Degree: Dummy  -0.526 
(0.660) 
-0.475 
(0.655) 
-0.450 
(0.650) 
-0.458 
(0.650) 
-0.499 
(0.656) 
-0.655 
(0.694) 
-0.490 
(0.653) 
-0.450 
(0.659) 
-0.616 
(0.673) 
-0.513 
(0.664) 
Higher National Diploma: Dummy -0.045 
(0.767) 
0.040 
(0.756) 
0.058 
(0.753) 
0.072 
(0.752) 
0.046 
(0.754) 
-0.196 
(0.785) 
0.051 
(0.753) 
0.067 
(0.807) 
-0.392 
(0.829) 
-0.181 
(0.805) 
Self Employed  -1.883** 
(0.809) 
-2.148*** 
(0.802) 
-1.969 
(0.794)** 
-2.068*** 
(0.786) 
-2.055*** 
(0.786) 
-2.170*** 
(0.787) 
-2.106*** 
(0.789) 
-2.457 
(0.907)*** 
-2.169** 
(0.893) 
-1.918** 
(0.823) 
Private Sector Employee -0.879 
(0.652) 
-1.072* 
(0.588) 
-1.090* 
(0.590) 
-1.087* 
(0.590) 
-1.059* 
(0.594) 
-1.107* 
(0.623) 
-1.127* 
(0.593) 
-0.854 
(0.605) 
-1.128* 
(0.633) 
-1.140* 
(0.609) 
Marital Status: Single 2.109*** 
(0.650) 
2.198*** 
(0.659) 
2.094*** 
(0.661) 
2.136*** 
(0.658) 
2.261*** 
(0.680) 
2.458*** 
(0.697) 
2.190*** 
(0.659) 
2.232*** 
(0.707) 
2.273*** 
(0.729) 
2.080*** 
(0.689) 
Average Monthly Income -0.215 
(0.266) 
         
Interest Rate   -0.091 
(0.168) 
        
Inflation Rate   0.138 
(0.176) 
       
Exchange Rate    0.073 
(0.201) 
      
National Growth Rate     -0.150 
(0.242) 
     
National Savings Rate      -0.552** 
(0.234) 
    
Unemployment Rate       -0.130 
(0.176) 
   
Interest Rate Effects        1.784*** 
(0.639) 
  
Collateral Security effects         2.614*** 
(0.893) 
 
Loan Size Effects          1.527** 
(0.610) 
Constant -0.964 
(1.473) 
-1.217 
(1.416) 
-1.887 
(1.435) 
-1.808 
(1.600) 
-0.941 
(1.589) 
0.764 
(1.672) 
-1.013 
(1.468) 
-1.964 
(1.387) 
-1.510 
(1.394) 
-1.686 
(1.378) 
 
 
  
 
Table 10 - Macroeconomic Performance, Credit Access Constraints and Defaults on Other Loans 
 M1 M2 M3  M4 M5  M6 M7 M8  M9 M10 
Household Size -0.354 
(0.593) 
-0.312 
(0.583) 
-0.345 
(0.584) 
-0.291 
(0.589) 
-0.318 
(0.594) 
-0.362 
(0.590) 
-0.309 
(0.588) 
-0.216 
(0.573) 
-0.271 
(0.582) 
-0.304 
(0.571) 
Female: Dummy 1.482** 
(0.648) 
1.435** 
(0.641) 
1.446** 
(0.646) 
1.576** 
(0.672) 
1.578** 
(0.680) 
1.416** 
(0.647) 
1.434** 
(0.644) 
1.197* 
(0.662) 
1.330** 
(0.665) 
1.186* 
(0.662) 
Age -0.121 
(0.379) 
-0.021 
(0.377) 
-0.071 
(0.383) 
-0.041 
(0.376) 
-0.022 
(0.377) 
-0.053 
(0.378) 
-0.027 
(0.378) 
-0.056 
(0.372) 
-0.054 
(0.377) 
-0.005 
(0.373) 
First Degree: Dummy  -0.474 
(0.864) 
-0.653 
(0.862) 
-0.646 
(0.875) 
-0.610 
(0.874) 
-0.586 
(0.871) 
-0.779 
(0.889) 
-0.650 
(0.864) 
-0.569 
(0.853) 
-0.651 
(0.858) 
-0.650 
(0.846) 
Higher National Diploma: Dummy -0.435 
(0.939) 
-0.633 
(0.929) 
-0.609 
(0.944) 
-0.572 
(0.945) 
-0.611 
(0.939) 
-0.811 
(0.969) 
-0.629 
(0.933) 
-0.516 
(0.941) 
-0.685 
(0.938) 
-0.616 
(0.939) 
Self Employed  -1.749** 
(0.841) 
-1.493* 
(0.809) 
-1.371* 
(0.810) 
-1.481* 
(0.809) 
-1.563* 
(0.815) 
-1.482* 
(0.799) 
-1.478* 
(0.798) 
-1.453* 
(0.832) 
-1.401) 
(0.816) 
-1.287 
(0.838) 
Private Sector Employee -1.406* 
(0.777) 
-0.987 
(0.687) 
-0.934 
(0.693) 
-0.947 
(0.684) 
-1.119 
(0.705) 
-0.897 
(0.696) 
-0.993 
(0.686) 
-0.808 
(0.693) 
-0.948 
(0.689) 
-1.012 
(0.700) 
Marital Status: Single 0.535 
(0.759) 
0.461 
(0.743) 
0.349 
(0.755) 
0.313 
(0.752) 
0.332 
(0.752) 
0.533 
(0.754) 
0.454 
(0.741) 
0.345 
(0.755) 
0.419 
(0.749) 
0.348 
(0.764) 
Average Monthly Income 0.389 
(0.321) 
         
Interest Rate   -0.023 
(0.193) 
        
Inflation Rate   0.180 
(0.224) 
       
Exchange Rate    0.235 
(0.229) 
      
National Growth Rate     0.235 
(0.295) 
     
National Savings Rate      -0.236 
(0.274) 
    
Unemployment Rate       0.009 
(0.209) 
   
Interest Rate Effects        1.299 
(1.061) 
  
Collateral Security effects         0.430 
(0.845) 
 
  
Loan Size Effects          1.501 
(1.660) 
Constant 1.501 
(1.813) 
2.423 
(1.779) 
1.954 
(1.776) 
1.531 
(1.868) 
1.592 
(1.954) 
3.371 
(2.087) 
2.322 
(1.858) 
2.109 
(1.657) 
2.338 
(1.675) 
2.149 
(1.660) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 11 - Macroeconomic Performance, Credit Access Constraints and Previous Challenges Repaying Mortgages 
 M1 M2 M3  M4 M5  M6 M7 M8  M9 M10 
Household Size -0.864* 
(0.471) 
-0.853* 
(0.472) 
-0.880* 
(0.476) 
-0.748 
(0.486) 
-0.826* 
(0.473) 
-0.952** 
(0.483) 
-0.908* 
(0.478) 
-0.729 
(0.484) 
-0.760 
(0.481) 
-0.848* 
(0.478) 
Female: Dummy 0.248 
(0.511) 
0.192 
(0.506) 
0.234 
(0.509) 
0.424 
(0.530) 
0.274 
(0.522) 
0.143 
(0.511) 
0.188 
(0.505) 
-0.236 
(0.547) 
-0.227 
(0.542) 
-0.077 
(0.532) 
Age 0.580 
(0.367) 
0.576 
(0.366) 
0.551 
(0.370) 
0.595* 
(0.361) 
0.606* 
(0.364) 
0.577 
(0.368) 
0.642* 
(0.371) 
0.581 
(0.362) 
0.488 
(0.360) 
0.601* 
(0.358) 
First Degree: Dummy  0.178 
(0.673) 
0.168 
(0.673) 
0.192 
(0.676) 
0.211 
(0.686) 
0.174 
(0.671) 
0.098 
(0.684) 
0.138 
(0.670) 
0.183 
(0.682) 
0.033 
(0.680) 
0.114 
(0.674) 
Higher National Diploma: Dummy -0.026 
(0.773) 
-0.045 
(0.773) 
-0.055 
(0.777) 
-0.059 
(0.783) 
-0.062 
(0.768) 
-0.183 
(0.779) 
-0.055 
(0.769) 
-0.146 
(0.825) 
-0.521 
(0.826) 
-0.320 
(0.805) 
Self Employed  -2.408*** 
(0.837) 
-2.219*** 
(0.801) 
-2.152*** 
(0.798) 
-2.350*** 
(0.827) 
-2.331*** 
(0.805) 
-2.387*** 
(0.799) 
-2.344*** 
(0.808) 
-2.844*** 
(0.985) 
-2.472*** 
(0.885) 
-2.210*** 
(0.815) 
Private Sector Employee -1.455** 
(0.671) 
-1.400** 
(0.608) 
-1.269** 
(0.604) 
-1.202** 
(0.603) 
-1.373** 
(0.602) 
-1.294** 
(0.611) 
-1.352** 
(0.602) 
-1.083* 
(0.614) 
-1.334** 
(0.624) 
-1.365** 
(0.610) 
Marital Status: Single 2.148*** 
(0.727) 
2.050*** 
(0.720) 
1.959*** 
(0.729) 
1.964*** 
(0.728) 
2.044*** 
(0.730) 
2.263*** 
(0.733) 
2.132*** 
(0.717) 
2.188*** 
(0.792) 
2.161*** 
(0.783) 
2.059*** 
(0.739) 
Average Monthly Income 0.111 
(0.268) 
         
Interest Rate   0.169 
(0.168) 
        
Inflation Rate   0.258 
(0.184) 
       
Exchange Rate    0.411** 
(0.209) 
      
National Growth Rate     0.114 
(0.251) 
     
National Savings Rate      -0.348 
(0.223) 
    
Unemployment Rate       -0.118 
(0.181) 
   
Interest Rate Effects        2.218*** 
(0.833) 
  
Collateral Security effects         2.291** 
(0.928) 
 
Loan Size Effects          1.033* 
(0.581) 
Constant -0.088 
(1.493) 
-0.333 
(1.462) 
-0.494 
(1.461) 
-1.449 
(1.625) 
-0.252 
(1.643) 
1.589 
(1.672) 
0.578 
(1.511) 
-0.152 
(1.397) 
0.388 
(1.408) 
0.139 
(1.384) 
  
 
Table 12 - Macroeconomic Performance, Credit Access Constraints and Defaults on Other Loans 
 M1 M2 M3  M4 M5  M6 M7 M8  M9 M10 
Household Size -1.318** 
(0.526) 
-1.325** 
(0.532) 
-1.371** 
(0540) 
-1.257** 
(0.551) 
-1.297** 
(0.525) 
-1.426*** 
(0.540) 
-1.336** 
(0.528) 
-1.192** 
(0524) 
-1.195** 
(0.523) 
-1.304** 
(0.532) 
Female: Dummy 0.885 
(0.571) 
0.864 
(0.573) 
0.919 
(0576) 
1.164** 
(0.610) 
0.882 
(0.585) 
0.806 
(0.575) 
0.840 
(0.565) 
0.598 
(0.584) 
0.579 
(0.582) 
0.593 
(0.588) 
Age 0.633 
(0.400) 
0.590 
(0.399) 
0.558 
(0.404) 
0.631 
(0.394) 
0.650 
(0.397) 
0.609 
(0.401) 
0.679 
(0.407) 
0.582 
(0.386) 
0.511 
(0.399) 
0.622 
(0.388) 
First Degree: Dummy  0.087 
(0.712) 
0.107 
(0.721) 
0.119 
(0.720) 
0.132 
(0.732) 
0.073 
(0.712) 
-0.014 
(0.737) 
0.060 
(0.711) 
0.117 
(0.704) 
-0.030 
(0.708) 
-0.005 
(0.708) 
Higher National Diploma: Dummy -0.452 
(0.800) 
-0.425 
(0.811) 
-0.442 
(0.816) 
-0.499 
(0.823) 
-0.474 
(0.799) 
-0.619 
(0.822) 
-0.462 
(0.799) 
-0.447 
(0.825) 
-0.734 
(0.831) 
-0.720 
(0.842) 
Self Employed  -2.131** 
(0.855) 
-1.923*** 
0.810) 
-1.905** 
(0.811) 
-2.112** 
(0.861) 
-2.053** 
(0.812) 
-2.169*** 
(0.815) 
-2.055** 
(0.812) 
-2.195** 
(0.896) 
-2.059** 
(0.860) 
-1.981** 
(0.856) 
Private Sector Employee -1.683** 
(0.740) 
-1.710** 
(0.689) 
-1.516** 
(0.677) 
-1.463** 
(0.668) 
-1.597** 
(0.667) 
-1.504** 
(0.684) 
-1.582** 
(0.660) 
-1.349** 
(0.664) 
-1.517** 
(0.663) 
-1.636** 
(0.678) 
Marital Status: Single 2.858*** 
(0.920) 
2.724*** 
(0.909) 
2.628*** 
(0.922) 
2.669*** 
(0.921) 
2.785*** 
(0.922) 
3.017*** 
(0.927) 
2.825*** 
(0.906) 
2.799*** 
(0.934) 
2.810*** 
(0.934) 
2.818*** 
(0.939) 
Average Monthly Income 0.090 
(0.280) 
         
Interest Rate   0.279 
(0.182) 
        
Inflation Rate   0.343* 
(0.201) 
       
Exchange Rate    0.484** 
(0.225) 
      
National Growth Rate     0.047 
(0.281) 
     
National Savings Rate      -0.439* 
(0.245) 
    
Unemployment Rate       -0.075 
(0.189) 
   
Interest Rate Effects        1.462** 
(0.793) 
  
  
Collateral Security effects         1.577* 
(0.884) 
 
Loan Size Effects          1.267* 
(0.685) 
Constant 0.616 
(1.574) 
0.044 
(1.552) 
0.047 
(1.541) 
-0.925 
(1.695) 
0.653 
(1.747) 
2.618 
(1.819) 
1.057 
(1.569) 
0.626 
(1.442) 
1.018 
(1.465) 
0.849 
(1.462) 
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